Mixed Synthesis

What we just discussed regarding organic and instrumental synthesis also applies to mixed synthesis. Our main issue is how we handle the joined presence of both interstitial longings. Remember that each longing predisposes the opposite pole of their parallel attribute pair (e.g. functionality predispose imperdurability). So, a mixed state that presents both longings simultaneously reflects an interstitial potential—one awaiting a dominant longing to take charge. We’ll call this potential state the raw form of mixed synthesis:

• Mixed Synthesis (Raw form):
  • {[I≢L → (I≡ ^ I≢)] ^ [C≡L → (C≡ ^ C≢)]} → {iD ≡ iO ≡ iR ≡ iE} = mS

Each longing can become the dominant one—this creates two concrete forms of mixed synthesis. Let’s review first both longing predispositions:

• Functionality Longing predispose Imperdurability.

  • Symbolic representation: C≡L → (I≡ ^ I≢) = I≡.

• Perdurability Longing predispose Dysfunctionality.

  • Symbolic representation: I≢L → (C≡ ^ C≢) = C≢.

Therefore, when one longing finally takes charge, you’ll end up with two possible interstitial states:

• Imperdurable Functionality.
• Perdurable Dysfunctionality.

This brings about a philosophical dilemma:

• Would you prefer a system that functions optimally but is imperdurable? Or do you prefer a stable and predictable system that works dysfunctionally?

On abstract conversation, this dilemma can promote an extensive debate. But our approach must aspire to integrate with the rest of the Inventive Edifications. Every EIC development must be tested against the other three edifications—therefore, they can’t remain abstract. Luckily for us, we are talking about systemic structures with examples that already exists in real life. We need to find examples that illustrate each choice:

1. A perdurable system that accepts dysfunctionality: C≢ ^ I≢.
2. A functional system that accepts imperdurability: I≡ ^ C≡.

For our first potential choice, let’s return to our previous reference of the empire. On this type of political structures, the lesser nations usually have very little influence on the decisions that the emperor takes. This creates a dysfunctional system of political representation. But for the emperor this type of dysfunctionality is not an issue, as long as they can unify the empire under their power. This forced unification maintains the perdurability of the empire, despite being dysfunctional.

With our second potential choice, we can use a structure closer to home: a presidential term. Most nations agree that the highest political positions in government must be held for a limited time. There are contextual and historical differences in each case, but there is a common reticence to allow perpetual terms. Even if a politician remains popular (which would imply functional governance) and could win an extra term, the system itself blocks it. Therefore, any government must reconcile political representation with societal needs and wants by accepting imperdurable terms.

The first choice is labeled Unification Synthesis, while the second choice is called Conciliation Synthesis. On the context of our examples, unification synthesis centralizes authority to preserve systemic durability, even at the cost of representation. Conversely, conciliation synthesis favors responsive representation, accepting its temporal limits as part of systemic renewal.

Ethically, conciliation synthesis is the preferable model. But the real challenge is practical: how can we deal with its imperdurability? The next section offers a potential answer to that question.